A book could be written about this program — called by the New York Times “perhaps the most spectacular and expensive failure in the 50-year history of American spy satellite programs.” In summary, NRO decided to develop optical and radar imagery satellites that were smaller, lighter and less expensive than the current satellites. Conceptual architectural studies began in 1996, but it wasn’t until 1999 that Boeing was awarded the optical and radar-imaging satellite contracts.
Boeing had underbid Lockheed Martin by a billion dollars. It was a very surprising selection since Lockheed Martin had supplied all the then-current imaging spacecraft — optical and radar — and Boeing had never built the kind of satellites the government was seeking. By 2005, an estimated $10 billion had been spent, twice the original estimate of $5 billion. Most analysts believe FIA was destined to fail because the technol- ogy needed to meet requirements wasn’t mature, there wasn’t enough funding, the schedule was unrealistic and the selection criteria and source selection process for the space element of FIA were flawed.
Free Satellite Program
In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids - New York Times 09:59 AM. A movies show (often simply TV show) is any content produced for broadcast via over-the-air, satellite, cable, or internet and typically viewed on a movies set, excluding breaking news, advertisements, or trailers that are typically placed between shows. Movies shows are most often scheduled well ahead of time and appear on electronic guides. SpaceX says its Starlink satellite internet can download 100 megabits per second, and 'space lasers' transfer data between satellites [email protected] (Morgan McFall-Johnsen) 2.
FIA - RECSAT - New Electro-Optical IMINT Satellite Concept Hardware Compromise
Boeing Concept:
On the one hand we have the original FIA, RECSAT design concept of Boeing now cancelled that can be roughly defined. The one RECSAT-FIA design concept in all details that has been developed here reflects its present status design heritage up to cancellation. Many of the applicable technologies were displayed in the very successful Boeing Orbital Express spacecraft design details and conceptual architecture. The FIA spacecraft has been in its original concept described as being a family of relatively small spacecraft that finally will make it possible to field a stealth black body like spacecraft so that it could actually perform its undetected imagery mission. It was also to be battle hardened for nuclear war, laser or ASAT attack with the ability to defend itself or go on the offensive based on vendor documents and open source literature. The latest FIA related technology development is reflected in the two spacecraft seen in the Boeing, Orbital Express and Ball aerospace literature brochures for the successful two satellite rendezvous propellant transfer demonstration. Presumably it closely mimics the original FIA spacecraft technology design intent. The fueling operation was to provide for propellant transfer or propellant service module replacement to give the spacecraft high maneuverability to carry out and extend it mission and even upgrade its sub systems modules repeatedly.
Satellite Program Manager
Boeing Related Technologies
Boeing & Lockheed Martin Related Technologies
Boeing Delta-4 Shroud Technologies
The spacecraft was expected to be eight sided multi radar deflecting paneled design for stealth purposes as well as being perhaps greater than half the length of a advanced Crystal with odd shaped radar deflecting solar arrays. The bottom line is the FIA’s optical imaging IMINT spacecraft went from bug automobile size to larger than SUV size approaching tractor trailer eighteen wheeler size before Lockheed received it renewal contract. This was due to the optical physics and nuclear, laser, ASAT, stealth, thermal control and general spacecraft battle hardening technology requirements. Some are still of the opinion that FIA misty follow-on was to be trunk of a large car size but it in fact grew vastly larger than that and the concept died real fast due to the optics issues. This by definition is not Misty follow-on as it was understood but is by definition the FIA spacecraft’s of Boeing that may also resemble some of the MicroSat systems design but more stealthier and battle hardened etc. Alternatively they could have used the one developed by Boeing as a sub contract. The “S” like shaped solar arrays is probable Lockheed from the Boeing project efforts on the X-37 program or from the Orbital Express program. This has presented two alternative solar array designs. Boeing did not make the mistake of TFX to try and do both FIA programs with a common system one fits all approach, Rather they decided to break it up between two divisions of Boeing working to their strengths with one actually successful while the IMINT division lost the effort and that should have been understood.
FIA, RECSAT Problems According to the New York Times: (1, 8)
1. Problem - Flawed Gyro-dynes from the manufacturer used for precise orientation control
2. Problem - Do not use Tin on the spacecraft or its systems
3. Problem - Combining close-up & wide field of view imagery capability in the same system
Never attempted successfully before became nearly impossible to accomplish
4. Problem - Control systems integrated circuitry defects and cabling defects
5. Problem – Lockheed Martin reopened the Advanced Crystal Production line with updates
The Follow-on Advanced Crystal was scheduled for launch in 2009 but has now slipped to 2010.
6. Avast secureline vpn license file crack free download. Problem - Three billion over budget and behind schedule with a far larger projected budge
than could or would be tolerated in representative government
Speculating on the Boeing Bus, Solar Arrays and External Body Stealth Design for FIA
Close study of the FIA related technology development is reflected in the two spacecraft seen in the Boeing, Orbital Express and Ball aerospace literature brochures for the successful two satellite rendezvous propellant transfer demonstration. The FIA RECSAT bus from an external appearance appears to very closely resemble the Bus-1 design of Lockheed Martin surrounded by a stealth eight sided shell radar evasive panels but it size grew from a smaller design of similar size and characteristics to the equivalent of the Bus-1 size similar to those used on the Advanced Crystal and apparently the Derivation Misty design. Boeing originally developed a Bus design concept for application to the ISS based on the ISS Node-X, (Ref. Node-X Design Concept - Alternate propulsion module Assessment team-NASA) (dry Node-X = 17,967.1 lbs, with its propulsion elements dry equaling 11,301.4 lbs wet 18,100.6 lbs) Alternate propulsion module or service module which was a reverse engineering design to that adapt to ISS for adaptation for shuttle flight that in many respects resembled the Lockheed Martin Bus-1 hardware. The new design developed by Boeing designed out the Shuttle related Trunnion’s for shuttle Node-X launch to a self supporting bus. This also implies that the six propellant tanks of the original Bus-1 design was changed to four tanks with a propellant mass/volume increase as seem in the MSFC ISS Node-X designs which seems very similar to the Bus-1 design. This bus supports both the instrument section and the telescope without fairing or Titan Payload Adapter very different from the previous Advanced Crystal, & Misty-1 design.
Lockheed is the curved solar array vendor as seen in the Lockheed solar array vendor document (Ref. Lockheed Missile & Space Company Solar Arrays – Fact sheets 10-85) and from both the President G. W. Bush (Senior) NARA Presidential Library Crystal RECSAT model display. These curved faceted solar arrays are made of battle hardened Gallium Arsenate and are designed to be folded and wrapped around the telescope barrel during launch. The radiator paned which are deployed with the solar arrays are designed to be launched folded around the Bus were probably developed by Boeing Hughes division. Both the Bus and Telescope optical system of the entire spacecraft is covered by radar evasive faceted stealth material panels on eight sides.
![Satellite Satellite](https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/photos/uncategorized/2008/02/12/satellite.jpg)
References:
1. Philip Taubman, In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids, The New York Times, November 11, 2007 , p. 1, 20, & 21.
8. http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/fia.htm , Future Imagery Architecture [FIA]
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This week’s case discusses what led to the collapse of the spy satellite program. The case discuses how budgetary constrain, and how a new comer in the future imagery business helped bring to the demise of the spy satellite program. The case also discusses how the federal government ignored warning signals from an internals assessment team tasked to study the attainability of the program. The team had warned before the contract was awarded to Boeing, that the program had lofty technological goals, and these goals were unattainable given the budgetary amount earmarked and schedule set for the spy satellite program to be completed. The spy satellite program had failed due to a set of compounding issues. In 1998 during the Clinton administration, the federal government in an effort to control cost and downsize government decided to award big military project to private contractors. The thinking is that private contractors are better placed to manage cost and engineering work. The government was also concerned with the wasteful habit prevalent at the satellite agency. To curb what it described as free- spending habit, the government decided to impose stringent spending guidelines for all new satellite programs. Thus, the federal government imposed a $5 billion spending cap on the first five years of the Future Imagery Architecture.
Another major reason why the program failed was because the federal government was interested in new ideas in the satellite industry. In the past, only a few select companies had won the bid to work on government satellite programs. In the bid to diversify, the government was looking for a company that could design a better and technologically sound satellite program at a cheaper cost. In the past, Lockheed Martin had bided, won, and produced most of the government satellite programs. The government this time was looking for a company that could deliver a better technologically sound satellite system than Lockheed Martin at a cheaper cost. When Boeing submitted its $5 billion dollar proposal to build the Future Imagery Architecture, the federal government obliged. The government accepted Boeing’s bid because Boeing complied with all its requisite demands. It was a different company than Lockheed Martin. It had submitted a proposal that met the federal government’s budget plan. It had also submitted new technologically ideas. The ideas presented by Boeing showcased that it will build a new satellite system that will be able to capture sharper images from space. The images will be able to show large areas on the ground clearly, and also clearer pictures of small objects on the ground.
Facts and chronology
After the 1991 gulf war, the armed forces were seeking increased tactical surveillance to transmit battle field images to commanders around the world. The new FIA satellite were sought to monitor and transmit reconnaissance information to military personnel on the ground wherever they maybe in the world. Ring ring ringa hindi mp3 song downloads for free. Thus, in the bid to meet this challenge, the federal government selected the bid submitted by Boeing to undertake the project. When Boeing won the bid in 1999, it chose Ed Nowinski a former CIA employee. Mr. Nowinski had served in the CIA for many years as the head of the satellite development program. Nowinski was first chosen to help put Boeing’s proposal together, and later served as the head of the FIA program. He was said to have received numerous awards at the CIA for his achievements and hard work, but he was fired from the CIA for using official vehicle for personal business. Nowinski was also later fired by Boeing in the dying days of the FIA program. Nowinski argued that the FIA failed not because of the proposal submitted by Boeing. He argued that the proposal was meticulously put together, but had little wiggle room for error, which means that any error will attract additional funding. This invariably meant that the program had to be perfectly executed, so to comply with the $5 billion dollar budget cap placed on it by the federal government. Nowinski however, argued the program failed because of substandard parts and. Boeing had contracted a critical component of the satellite program to a subcontractor who had changed its manufacturing process for this crucial part. The problem of a faulty gyroscope was not discovered until three years later. There were also reports of other defective parts such as defective cables, which consistently stalled the program. As a result of these failures, failed parts had to be rebuilt from scratch, cost escalated and program was in jeopardy of meeting the set deadline.
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Analysis
Rubin rightly pointed out when she discussed that politics plays an integral role in how government funds are budgeted. She further elucidates when she states that in order to forestall unnecessary waste of public funds, government can and have implemented strict budgetary cap on those programs it believes are reckless with public funds. According to Rubin government implementation of strict budget policies to curb waste of public funds is politically motivated. In imposing these strict measures, government is trying to let the public know that it is a good custodian of its money. The Clinton administration in 1998 implemented a strict budget cap on the FIA program for two reasons. First, it wanted to ensure that public funds were not wasted unnecessarily on the FIA satellite system as in past programs. Second, the federal government was looking to build the most efficient image reconnaissance satellite at a reasonable amount.
One cannot fault the federal government for trying to control waste and ensure that public funds are judiciously put to use. However, on this particular project they were warning signals from day one, even from the federal government’s assessment team. The team had questioned Boeing’s bid, given the fact that the company had presented lofty technological goals. The team had reasoned that given the lofty ideas presented by Boeing, the federal budget of $5 billion may not be enough funds to complete the FTA program. There were also concerns of time constraint as well from the team. Thus, they were warning signals, that the program was underfunded. But Boeing had presented an ambitious plan to counteract that claim. Nowinski who served in public life for over thirty years spearheaded the bid. He argued that he was over sympathetic with the federal government. He had not allowed objective minds to understudy the program and submit an appropriate bid for the satellite program. He blamed himself for not assembling the right team from the onset of the program. He finally admitted by stating that with the right amount of money and time, Boeing would have been able to accomplish the goals set in the FTA program.
One will not be arguing erroneously if one postulates that the federal government in part had to be blamed for the failures of the FTA program. There were warning signs from the onset of the program. The signs were recognized by a federal team that Boeing had some lofty goals that demanded greater funding. The federal government should have realized from the onset that Boeing was a novice in the satellite business, and they should have asked the tough questions before awarding the contract. They should have inquired how Boeing was going to accomplish the set goals given the strict and tight budget measures. They should have also sought to understand how Boeing will correct errors, in a trivial industry where mistakes are almost inevitable. Mistakes in tells that additional funding will be required to resolve the error. And above all, they should harken to the findings of the team, when it recommended that the schedule to deliver the FTA was almost unattainable. These questions should have been put forward to Boeing managers before the award.
It is easy to underscore why these questions were not asked. One can argue that the federal government was looking to build a state of the art reconnaissance satellite at a reduced prize. The government’s intent one will argue is admirable, but given what the government is looking to achieve and accomplish, it is unattainable.
Conclusion
The keys issues of consideration as a public official are the following:
The federal government erred when it awarded the contract to Boeing for the following reasons. If the federal government was looking to build satellite systems that could produce better images and more precise and accurate information, it should have gone back to those companies or organization that had a history of building satellites systems in the past. One will argue that a company like Lockheed Martin would have been able to improve on a technology it had worked on in the past. The government rather chose a novice in the satellite industry in Boeing to develop an improved version of a satellite system Boeing had never built before.
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It is not improper to argue that in the bid to save public funds the federal government rather wasted more funds that it anticipated by awarding the FTA satellite system to Boeing without properly ensuring that it could deliver on the program. The federal government ended up expanded more funds in order to save the program. At the end of the day, it wasted over $18 billion dollars in public funds in a flawed program.
Review Question
Yes I agree. Public budgets are not merely technical managerial documents, they are also intrinsically political. Most budgets in the public sector are created to showcase to the public that the government is at work. In the case being discussed, although the FTA program was said to be flawed, they were some politicians who were in favor of the program and sought avenues to keep the program alive so as to continue to create jobs for members of their constituency. In this case, it did not matter if the program was viable or not, what mattered most to the politician in question, is that funding for the FTA program continues so that the said politician will remain viable politically among his constituents.
Lessons learned:
I was able to learn that without proper, objective and frank assessment of a public program, a governmental agency may end up spending more on a project than it anticipated. Therefore, a thorough vetting and price evaluation is appropriate so as to allow public officials fully understand how much will be spent on a program, and if such a program is worth spending on. The theory of “penny wise pound foolish” should be avoided at all cost in the public domain
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